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The Republic of Haiti is a prime international remittance-recipient country in the Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) region, relative to its gross domestic product (GDP). 
The downside of this fact may be that Haiti, based on population size, is also the largest 
exporter of skilled workers in the world. The present research uses a zero-altered 
negative binomial (with logit inflation) to model the international migration 
decision-process of households, and endogenous regressors’ Amemiya generalized least 
squares method (instrumental variable Tobit, IV-Tobit) to account for selectivity and 
endogeneity issues to assess the impact of remittances on labour market outcomes. The 
results in terms of a decline of labour supply in the presence of remittances are in line 
with those observed thus far in the literature. However, the impact of international 
remittances does not seem to be important in determining the labour participation 
behaviour, particularly for women, in the recipient households.  
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1 Introduction 
International migration of workers is a constant factor in the relatively short history of 
Haiti as a free republic. Important waves of emigration can be dated to the early 
twentieth century when Haitians travelled to Cuba to work in the zafra.1 It is estimated 
that between 1910 and 1930, some 200,000 Haitians, pushed by economic hardship, 
migrated to Cuba to work on sugar cane plantations (Proudfoot 1950). The migration 
flows to Cuba went unabated until the Batista regime when an amendment of the Cuban 
immigration law in 1939 banned black workers and started the massive deportation of 
Haitians (ibid.: 50). During the same period, the migration of Haitians also started to the 
Dominican Republic (DR) for the same reason: seeking work. Although actual numbers 
are not readily available, several authors concur that the Haiti-DR migration corridor 
was far more important than the Haiti-Cuba movement (see, for instance, Castor 1971: 
88; Lundahl 1979: 625). The flow of Haitian workers to the DR was halted in 1937 by 
the ‘perejil’ massacre under the Trujillo regime.2 But as incredible as it may seem, 
Haitian workers in 1939 resumed their exodus to the DR (Perusek 1984), and it is 
estimated that to date about one million Haitians live in the country (Ratha and Shaw 
2007).  
Ironically, while thousands of Haitians were leaving for Cuba and the DR at the turn of 
the twentieth century facing various hardships throughout their journey, the hundreds of 
Catholics from the Near East (mainly Lebanese, Syrians, and later Palestinians) arrived 
in Haiti in search of a better fortune.  
The second important wave of Haitian emigration occurred at the beginning of the 
Duvalier era in the early 1960s. In contrast to earlier waves, migration during this era 
was primarily motivated by political reasons. Most of these departing Haitians were 
middle and upper-middle class families and were in general very well-educated.3 
Regular destinations were Canada, United States, France, and the newly independent 
African nations.  
The emigration of Haitians persists to date and has become even more widespread. 
Destination countries have not changed much, except for Cuba and the African nations. 
The result of these migration outflows is that Haiti ranks fourth in the world (82 per 
cent) among the countries losing their tertiary-educated migrants, after Surinam (90 per 
cent), Guyana (86 per cent), and Jamaica (83 per cent) (Docquier and Marfouk 2006). 
Based on population size,4 Haiti ranks as the foremost exporter of skilled migrants 
(Ratha and Shaw 2007).  
                                                 
1  Zafra refers to the sugar cane harvest period in Cuba.  
2   The word, perejil, meaning parsley in Spanish, could determine the fate of a black person living on the 
borderlands between Haiti and Dominican Republic whether or not he would be spared by the 
Dominican officials. As it was believed that those of Haitian origin were unable to pronounce the 
word, its correct pronunciation became the deciding factor. Trujillo’s movement to expel Haitians 
from the Dominican Republic became known as the Parsley Massacre: Operación Perejil, or El Corte, 
according to its popular name.  
3  See, for instance, Jadotte (1977) for an early research on Haitian immigrants moving to Quebec in 
Canada. 
4   In countries with populations in excess of five million. 2 
Figure 1 
Haiti international remittances inflows, ODA, and FDI, 1971-2005 5  
 
Source:   World Bank (WDI). 
A frequent outcome of emigration, particularly with regard to the developing countries, 
is remittances. Remittance flows to developing countries totalled US$251 billion in 
2007, an increase of almost 14 per cent over the previous year, US$221 billion.6 For the 
developing countries, the magnitude of external resources from remittances surpasses 
official development assistance (ODA) and is second to foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which reached US$379 billion in 2006. In the case of Haiti, remittance inflows, after a 
record high of 52.4 per cent relative to GDP in 2004, totalled US$1,184 billion in 2007. 
This non-labour income flow from remittances represents not only a source of better 
livelihoods to many Haitian households living on the brink of poverty, but has also 
infused the country’s economy with much needed capital. As can seen in Figure 1, 
remittances now surpass both FDI and ODA combined, and seem to be unaffected by 
politics, as is often the case with ODA.  
The figures indicate the magnitude of the impact this income source has for Haiti. 
Despite the relevance of international migration and remittances to Haiti’s economy, 
research in the field is scanty and largely descriptive. Insufficient attention has been 
paid to the evaluation of the economic implications of these two factors. Data from a 
recent survey by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB 2007) reveal that 45 per 
cent of Haitian households have a family member living abroad, and 31 per cent of 
these households receive on average US$150 in remittances, of which almost 80 per 
cent is spent on consumption. Orozco (2006) perceives remittances in Haiti as a vehicle 
for social inclusion, as these enable greater participation in the market process through 
the higher demand capacity bestowed by remittances on deprived recipient households.  
According to Lamaute-Brisson (2002: 175-6), whenever remittance resources are 
targeted to financing economic activities, they are generally allotted to informal 
operations in the service sector with its low level of productivity. Moreover, Lamaute-
                                                 
5   Remittance values are missing for the years 1990 to 1997 and are thus extrapolated, based on the 
assumption that remittances increased during this period at the growth rate averaged for 1971-89. All 
data are from the World Bank (World Development Indicators, WDI), except data on remittances, 
which are from the IMF’s balance of payments. 
6   See Ratha and Xu (2008).  3 
Brisson (2003) maintains that even though remittances allow some households to escape 
poverty, they do not necessarily reduce inequality in Haiti, as these transfers generally 
accrue to the top income distribution deciles. This argument is in line with Jadotte 
(2006).  
Figures 2 and 3, with their associated Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests, corroborate this 
fact and are also in line with Jadotte (2006). First, we estimate kernel densities for 
migrants (i.e., households with relatives abroad) and non-migrant households with the 
counterfactual of ex ante remittance per equivalent adult income;7 then, the same 
assessment is done with the inclusion of remittance income. The results show that 
migrant households fare better than their non-migrant counterparts, and the difference 
between the two groups widens once remittance income is accounted for. The 
robustness of this finding is ascertained with the K-S test. 
Remittances can have far reaching impacts on recipient households and these effects can 
extend beyond the initial recipient of the transfer. An extensive body of literature 
presents evidence on the importance of international migration and remittances, and 
their micro and macroeconomic links. Although it has traditionally been established that 
outmigration, particularly the south-north pattern,8 causes depletion of human capital 
stock in the developing countries through the so-called braindrain effect,9 emigration in 
some quarters is perceived as a bonus, as it is often accompanied by remittances that 
may attenuate some of the possible negative impacts of population outflows. In addition 
to the claim that poverty rates decline in recipient households,10 remittances allow 
liquidity-constrained families to free up resources for investment, say, in health and 
education. Many studies have attempted to determine the existence of a positive 
correlation between level of schooling of children in migrant households and 
remittances (Hanson and Woodruff 2003; Cox-Edwards and Ureta 2003; López-
Córdova 2005; Acosta 2006;11 McKenzie and Rapoport 2006). Using anthropometric 
measures, height-for-age and weight-for-age Z-scores as proxies for health status, 
Acosta, Fajnzylber and Lopez (2007), and Mansuri (2007) note that children in 
 
                                                 
7   The equivalence scale used is the one proposed by Jadotte (2006). 
8   South-south migration flows are also important. For instance, Ratha and Shaw (2007) estimate that 
some 74 million migrants live in the developing countries, representing about 47 per cent of all 
migrants, but these authors also conclude that the remittance impact of this group is negligible, 
accounting for only 9 per cent of the remittance amounts received by developing countries.  
9   A growing body of the literature has contemplated the possibility of a brain gain (or ‘beneficial’ 
braindrain) as a result of migration. Seminal papers in this literature include Mountford (1997), Stark, 
Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998), Vidal (1998), Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2003), 
Stark and Wang (2002), Stark (2004), Stark et al. (2004).   
10 The results tend to be conflicting in terms of the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality when 
remittances are endogenized. Using a no migration counterfactual, the poverty- or inequality-reducing 
effects of remittances tend to decline, disappear, or become inverted when these are treated as a 
substitute for one of the household income sources, rather than an exogenous increase in household 
income. See, for instance, Acosta et al. (2007) and the literature therein for evidence on Latin 
American and Caribbean countries.  
11 Acosta (2006) finds no significant effect of remittances on schooling after wealth has been controlled 
for. 4 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test 
rejecting the hypothesis of equal distribution functions (Figure 2) 
Smaller group  D  P-value  Corrected 
Non migrant    0.0957  0.000   
Migrant   -0.0007  0.999   
Combined K-S:   0.0957  0.000   0.000 
Source:  Author’s own calculations based on the ECVH-2001. 
 
Figure 3 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test 
rejecting the hypothesis of equal distribution functions (Figure 3) 
Smaller group  D  P-value  Corrected 
Non migrant   0.2041  0.000   
Migrant   -0.0005  0.999   
Combined K-S   0.2041  0.000   0.000 
Source:  Author’s own calculations based on the ECVH-2001. 5 
remittance-receiving households in Guatemala and Nicaragua and rural Pakistan have a 
higher index in both measures. Infant mortality also appears to be lower in these 
recipient households. Similar results are noted for Mexico (López-Córdova 2005) and 
Uganda (Ssengonzi, De Jong and Stokes 2002). In addition, remittances can enable 
small entrepreneurs in developing countries, where access to credit markets is generally 
more restricted, to undertake riskier, yet more profitable activities.12  
On the other hand, international migration may also have negative impacts on the 
educational attainment of children in migrant households, due to the lack of positive 
parental influence on a child’s assiduity. At the macroeconomic level, large inflows of 
foreign exchange can have serious consequences resulting from the advance effects on 
tradable commodities and on relative competitiveness due to an appreciation of real 
exchange rates in the receiving country.13 This may be particularly true in the case of 
small economies where remittance inflows are large in comparison to the country’s 
GDP. A type of ‘Dutch disease’ effect may arise from the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and can eventually result in a balance-of-payment crisis, as currency 
appreciation will most likely restrict the country’s ability to export.14  
Furthermore, it is often asserted that remittances reduce the shadow value of market 
wages (particularly for women) in recipient households. As is established in the labour 
economics literature, the supply of labour declines concurrently with an individual’s 
reservation wage (see Killingworth 1983). Thus, if remittances increase the reservation 
wage of individuals in remittance-receiving households, the impact on labour force 
participation behaviour can be expected to be negative. According to the standard 
conjecture, this negative effect in a developing country context will be strong among 
women, particularly in households with high dependency ratios. This is based on the 
premise that in the presence of remittances, which are a non-labour source of income, 
the shadow value of market wages is low. Consequently, remittances may allow 
individuals to exit the labour market in favour of either home production or simply to 
increase the consumption of leisure. On the other hand, if remittances relax credit 
constraints and allow households to engage in entrepreneurial or commercial activities, 
the impact on labour may be positive. In addition, migration in itself will exert upward 
pressure on the home-country wage rates, with potential positive effects on labour 
supply. Thus, the ultimate effect of international remittances on labour market outcomes 
is somewhat ambiguous, becoming an empirical issue.  
Finally, some authors question the much heralded benefits of remittances, asserting that 
a pattern of idleness and dependency may be triggered. Other researchers point to the 
fact that the expected development impact of remittance income through sustained 
                                                 
12 See Yang (2004) for evidence from the Philippines and Acosta (2007) for evidence from El Salvador.  
13 See, among others, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) for Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2007) for evidence for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
14 Some researchers would argue that, as is generally presented in textbooks, labour migration is a 
substitute for trade and therefore consideration of its negative impact on trade through remittances is 
pointless. We will not take up the discussion here, as it is beyond the scope of this research.  6 
growth has not been proven, and therefore consider remittances to be the new 
development mantra or a craze that will soon fade.15  
Indeed, much is expected from remittance income flows, but their existence and the 
sheer magnitude of the amounts involved may be indicative of nations that are deeply 
dysfunctional and void of opportunities for their citizens. Even if it were true that this 
stable source of income can be leveraged so as to provide greater advantage to the 
receiving countries, remittances are neither a panacea nor a shortcut solution to their 
development problems. 
In this paper we investigate the effects of international migration and remittances on 
labour market outcomes and provide evidence for the Republic of Haiti on the 
behaviour of recipient households. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 covers a 
brief survey of the pertinent literature. Section 3 presents the data source, while 
section 4 describes the methodology used for the analysis and discusses the econometric 
issues pertaining to the estimation procedure. Section 5 gives the results and a brief 
discussion while section 6 concludes and points to some future lines of research.  
2  Brief review of earlier empirical literature  
Following the pioneering works of Stark and Bloom (1985) and Stark and Levhari 
(1982), which gave rise to the so-called ‘new economics of labour migration’ (NELM), 
a number of researchers have attempted to unravel the economic implications of 
international migration on the developing countries. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
(2006a) find that in Mexico remittances do affect the labour response of both female 
and male workers. The authors calculate that a 16 per cent increase in the monthly per 
capita remittance income is associated with a 15 per cent decline in the number of hours 
worked per month in the formal sector in both urban and rural areas. In other words, 
each addition of 100 Mexican pesos to the remittance income reduces labour in the 
formal sector by 32 hours. In contrast, they note that a similar addition to the remittance 
income increases informal sector employment by the same number of hours as the 
formal sector declines. Their results clearly suggest that remittance income induces a 
reallocation of labour by among males. On the part of females, Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo note that remittance accretion triggers a reduction in the hours worked for all types 
of employment, suggesting that an income effect dominates the substitution effect 
among Mexican females with respect to remittance income. Acosta’s (2006) results are 
similar for El Salvador, where the author notes that male labour supply remains 
unaffected while female labour declines as remittances rise. Kim (2006) and Bussolo 
and Medvedev (2008) find the same conclusion for Jamaica in terms of a general 
decline of labour outcomes among remittance-recipient households. 
Funkhouser (1992) observes that on the part of Nicaragua, remittances promote 
entrepreneurial activities (self-employment) for men but reducing at the same the labour 
supply with respect to women. Woodruff and Zenteno’s (2004) results for Mexico also 
seem to indicate that remittances, by increasing small-scale self-employment, help to 
relax the finance and capital constraints inhibiting the development of small enterprises. 
                                                 
15 For further insight on these views see, among others, Kritz, Keely and Tomasi 1981; Durand and 
Massey 1992; Kapur 2003; de Haas 2005; Bussolo and Medvedev 2007; Grigorian and Melkonyan 
2008. 7 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006b) come to a contrary conclusion for the Dominican 
Republic, noting that remittances are associated with a reduction in the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial activities among recipient households. Hanson (2007) observes that in 
Mexico, women in the high-migration states are less likely to work outside their home 
than men.  
The same negative association of labour market participation and the hours worked with 
remittances is noted for the Philippines by Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001). However, 
the authors emphasize that the negative labour response to remittances is more acute for 
men than women. Brown and Leeves (2007) try to unravel the impact of remittance 
inflows on the different income sources of recipient households in Fiji and Tonga. By 
extrapolation, their results may be similarly interpreted if extra income from a given 
source is construed as extra work (i.e., assuming no change in the productivity level of 
the individual). The authors observe, on average, a decline in income from subsistence 
agriculture and wage employment while income from farming and own business 
expands because of remittances. If the foregoing assumption is plausible, this would 
suggest that labour is being reallocated from subsistence agriculture and wage 
employment to farming and entrepreneurship, which may imply that a realignment of 
the economic structure of these two small islands has been induced by remittances.  
To our knowledge, no previous study has addressed the issue of international migration 
and remittances in Haiti through these lenses. The objective of this paper is to promote 
our understating on the matter and hopefully to fill the void in this research field for 
Haiti.  
3  The data source 
We use the ECVH-2001 (in English, Haitian Living Conditions Survey-HLCS), which 
contains data on 7,186 households. The survey includes information on both internal 
and international migration movements, but our focus is on the latter. The questions 
pertaining to migration and remittances that are of interest for the analysis include: 
(i)  the number of relatives in the household who live abroad and (ii) whether the 
household receives remittances. Although the survey collects information on returnees, 
it does not provide data on the schooling of non-returning immigrants.  
The data disclose that about one-third of Haitian households have at least one member 
living in a foreign country. Of this group, approximately two-thirds receive remittances 
that account for more than 40 per cent of their income.16 On average, more than 25 per 
cent of Haitian households receive remittances either from a relative or a friend abroad, 
representing slightly more than 17 per cent of total income. This figure exceeds the 
15.32 per cent of GDP reported by the IMF balance-of-payment statistics for the same 
period. The difference may be attributable to our definition of remittances, as we 
included cash, in-kind transfers, and gifts from relatives and friends abroad. In that 
sense, we believe there is no risk of important downward biases in the coefficients 
capturing the impact of remittances. However, it is worth bearing in mind that informal 
channels can be used to transfer non-negligible amounts of remittances and that 
households are more likely to remember whether or not they have received remittances 
                                                 
16 In fact, some households (2 per cent) reported remittances as constituting their sole source of income. 8 
than to recall the exact transfer amount received from abroad. Average remittances 
amount to HTG 4,831 with a Gini index among recipient households of 0.72.17 
4  Methodology and econometric issues 
A serious concern in estimating the impact of international migration on labour market 
outcomes through remittances is the potential non-randomness of the treatment group, 
i.e., the migrants. As the kernel density estimates and the K-S tests in section 1 
suggested, migrant and non-migrant households seem to be different. If this is the case, 
the possibility of self-selection exists with regard to migration, and therefore the sample 
of migrants and remittance senders is not random. Appendix Table A2 provides further 
evidence on the systematic difference between migrant and non-migrant households in 
two key observable factors, namely education and wealth.  
In line with the NELM hypothesis advanced by Stark and Bloom (1985), we can 
construe remittances to be determined in conjunction with migration, whereby the 
former is generally a precondition for the latter. In such a case, remittances are not the 
result of altruism, but rather intertemporal inter-vivo transfers motivated by contractual 
arrangements between the migrant and the relatives left behind. Assuming the 
plausibility of the previous statement, and to paraphrase (Hoddinott 1994), the best 
approach to modelling migration is to tackle it as the outcome of a joint utility 
maximization by the prospective migrant and other household members (those who will 
be left behind). Furthermore, migration and remittances may be simultaneously affected 
by other income sources that influence the labour supply behaviour of the recipient 
households. This simultaneous determination of migration and remittances could lead to 
synchronic correlation across the equation for remittances and the focus equation, 
namely labour supply. This brings forth a serious endogeneity problem that needs to be 
addressed properly.  
To address the selectivity bias problem, a migration process model is estimated in a first 
stage and the predicted number of migrants per household is used as an instrument in 
the remittances equation.18 To take advantage of the structure of the outcome variable 
(since a non-negligible percentage of households have more than one migrant), the 
migration equation is estimated with a count model.  
Traditionally, count regression models have appealed to Poisson, which assumes 
equidispersion of the first and second moments (i.e., the conditional mean and the 
conditional variance are equal). A Poisson process for the migration (M) equation could 
be represented as in Equation (1) below: 











== =  (1) 
We carried out a first test of mean and variance comparison and found some evidence of 
over-dispersion, which cast doubt on a true Poisson data-generating process of the 
outcome variable. In fact, many households have more than one migrant. The number of 
                                                 
17    The average exchange rate during the survey data collection period (May-August 2001) is   
HTG 24.03 = US$1 (source: Banque de la République d’Haïti, available at: www.brh.net).  
18  See Taylor, Rozelle and de Brauw (2003) for a similar early application of this procedure.  9 
migration-participating households, with one to 14 close relatives abroad, totals 2,124. 
This represents about one-third migration participation rate. Moreover, approximately 
48 per cent of migration-participating households have more than one relative living 
abroad and approximately 24 per cent have more than two. Accordingly, unobserved 
heterogeneity was introduced in the above equation to account for the fact that certain 
households have higher counts than others, proceeding with the estimation via a 
gamma-Poisson mixture model, and giving rise to a negative binomial model (which we 
assume is of type 1). The preference of the negative binomial model over the Poisson 
was further ascertained with a likelihood ratio test. Thus, under the negative binomial 
distribution, we can posit the probability of observing m number of migrants in 















== =  (2) 
where the conditional mean and conditional variance are given, respectively, by:  
() i EM λ =  (3) 
() () ( ) 1 V a rM EM EM α =+ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (4) 
withln ' i X λ β =  and X a vector of covariates capturing individual, household, and 
regional characteristics. As can be deducted from Equation (4), when the dispersion 
parameter  α equals zero, the model boils down to a standard Poisson. While a 
considerable percentage of migration-participating households have more than one 
relative abroad, many households have none. This results in a large amount of zeros in 
the outcome variable. So, to account for the excess zero count, we estimate a zero-
altered negative binomial model with logit inflation to contrast it with a standard 
negative binomial model. The Vuong test favoured the zero-inflated negative binomial 
(ZINB) model over the standard one.19 
A key issue in estimating Equation (2) is the identification of the migration process. As 
has been established in several works in the literature, development of networks reduces 
settlement costs (i.e., expenses associated with migration are less of a burden) and thus 
makes the financing of travel abroad less constraining.20 Moreover, contact with 
individuals who have had experience from abroad provides useful information to 
potential migrants, lowering the risk and uncertainty of migration. Both regional 
migration rates and the presence of returned migrants in a household are used as 
network variables for identification of the migration equation.21 The regional migration 
rate is derived as the ratio of the total number of migrants compared to the population of 
a particular region, while for the household network we take into consideration 
individuals who have spent more than three months abroad before returning home. To 
                                                 
19  See Appendix Table A3 for the result of the likelihood ratio test and the Vuong test favouring the 
negative binomial model over Poisson and the ZINB over the standard Negbin. For further discussion 
on count data models, see Greene (1994) and Cameron and Trivedi (1998). 
20  See for instance Massey and Lindstrom (1994); Perdersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2004). 
21 Correlation between these two network variables is low (0.1167), avoiding therefore the potential risk 
of collinearity between them.  10 
assure the variability of the former (i.e., the regional migration rate) across households, 
we interact it with household size. Finally, the validity of the model’s specification to 
predict the probability of migration was also assessed using Pregibon’s (1980) 
goodness-of-link test.  
As regard to the remittance equation, the following functional form is adopted:  
'
01 ii i i RM Z δ δδ ε =+ + +
)
 (5) 
where  R is the monthly adult equivalent remittances received, M
)
is the predicted 
number of migrants from Equation (2) above, Z΄ is the vector of individual and 
household characteristics, and ε is an error term. The labour market response of 
remittance-recipient households, which is the focus of the analysis, is given as follows: 
'
01 2 3 ii i i i LM R φ φφ φη =+ + + Ω +
)
 (6) 
where L is the number of hours worked, Ω΄ is a vector of individual and household 
characteristics, and η is the error term. The estimation of Equation (6) raises another 
issue, in that the dependent variable has both a discrete and continuous nature and can 
also be zero-inflated since many individuals will report zero hours of work. So, to 
account for the structure of the dependent variable, a Tobit model is estimated to assess 
the behaviour of remittance-receiving households in the labour market.22 As stated 
earlier, remittances can be endogenously determined and, as is rightly pointed by 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006a), a reverse causality may arise as the number of 
hours worked (or simply participation in the labour market) may influence the decision 
of remittance senders. To address this endogeneity issue, the regional migration rate 
variable is interacted with the percentage of non-migrant household members with 
secondary and tertiary education and used, along with the predicted number of migrants, 
as instruments for remittances. Exogeneity condition compliance of these instruments to 
the labour equation is assessed by regressing per adult equivalent remittances on these 
three instruments. They yield a joint significance F-statistics = 183 (Pr > F = 0.000) for 
men, while the correlation with hours worked is, respectively, -0.008, 0.045, 0.047. For 
women these values, in the same order, are 249, 0.000, 0.026, and 0.003.  
As stated previously, the costs associated with migration may inhibit certain households 
from undertaking such an enterprise, particularly in a context of imperfect credit 
markets which permeate developing countries such as Haiti. Accordingly, household 
wealth and its square are considered to control for the fact that wealthier households are 
less liquidity-constrained to finance migration costs and therefore migration 
probabilities will increase with wealth. However, after a certain threshold wealthy 
households may face higher opportunity costs of migration and are therefore less likely 
to migrate.  
Cognizant of the potential endogeneity problem with this variable, since wealth may be 
positively correlated with contemporaneous remittance flows, we approximated wealth 
using durable goods and amenities (e.g., refrigerator, vehicle, running water and access 
                                                 
22 In the case of a Probit estimation, L would be a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the 
household participates in the labour market and 0 otherwise. So, an IV-Probit model is later estimated 
to assess the robustness of the results. 11 
to electrical network, quality of walls, floor and roof of the house, etc.) which more 
likely can represent the long-term economic status of a household. To construct the 
wealth index, we adopted the principal components analysis (PCA) and closely 
followed the procedure developed by Filmer and Pritchett (2001). The value of the 








⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦ =∑ , (7) 
where  ij A is a binary indicator expressing whether household i  possesses asset j, 
j A  and
2
j σ are, respectively, the sample mean over all assets and the sample variance of 
asset j across households; finally,  j ω is the weight assigned to asset j and is based on the 
eigenvalues of the first components. The first and second moment of the index are 
expected to satisfy the condition, W ~ N(0,1). The validity of the assets used in the PCA 
is ascertained through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) index of sampling adequacy. 
The PCA yields a KMO measure that is equal to 0.9131 (the maximum is unity), 
guaranteeing in that sense a high degree of acceptance of the thirty components used in 
building the wealth index.23    
Now, a robust appraisal of a household’s long-term economic status based on this index 
would require that information on pre-migration wealth is used since the self-
selectiveness of migration and the ensuing remittances could imply the possibility that 
remittance income has been used to purchase such assets (Acosta 2006). Appendix 
Table A1 compares household income, wealth (using the proxy above), migration 
participation rate, and remittance receipts as a ratio of income per adult equivalent. 
Indeed, the wealth index increases monotonically with income quintiles but as can be 
observed, the share of remittances as a percentage of income exhibits an almost opposite 
pattern, despite the fact that low-quintile households are less likely to participate in 
migration and receive remittances than their high-quintile counterparts.24  
5  Results and discussion 
Appendix Table A3 presents the results of the ZINB model that includes 6,070 
observations of the working-aged population of 15-64 years, inclusively. Different 
specifications were explored and our criterion for selecting this model was based mainly 
on the lowest values of Akaike and Bayes criterion. As mentioned in section 4, the data 
support the negative binomial over a Poisson model with a likelihood ratio test for  
ln α = -∞ that is equal to 438 and significant at the 1 per cent level. Furthermore, a 
Vuong test (z = 3.82, Pr >
2 χ = 0.000) established preference of a zero-inflated negative 
binomial over a standard negative binomial model. As for the covariates, all the 
 
                                                 
23 Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) argue that the PCA approach may blur the distinction between 
differences in wealth and in taste if the full set of proxy variables are not used. Using the full set of 
proxies did not substantially improve our measure of sampling adequacy.  
24 For similar application to El Salvador, see Acosta (2006).   12 
Table 3 
IV-Tobit model of labour supply (hours worked) by headship (working age 15-64) 
 Men  z-Stat    Women  z-Stat 
Monthly equivalent remittances  -0.068
***  -4.750 -0.052
**  -2.640 
Years of schooling  3.141
*** 4.430 1.521  1.570 
Wealth index  9.205
*** 4.470 11.679
**  2.600 
Experience -0.568  -0.490  6.319
***  5.800 
Experience squared  0.019  1.130  -0.085
***  -5.270 
Married (1 if married, or lives in common-law union)1  -0.879 -0.150  -6.294 -0.900 
Presence of returned migrant  21.053
* 1.870 4.520  0.320 
Home (1 if property is owned de jure) 8.571  1.400  17.197
**  2.380 
Household size  2.639  1.500  3.222
**  2.170 
Hardship   -28.820
*** -3.630 -12.809  -1.520 
Livestock (number of large animals)  -12.576
** -1.960 -14.291
*  -1.640 
Hectare (land holding in hectares)  0.807 1.080  1.390 0.990 
Semi-urban 30.819
*** 3.030 -10.210  -0.890 
Rural 24.819
** 2.560 -9.164  -0.810 
Male (1 if migrant is male)  29.610
*** 3.450 16.933  1.520 
Female (1 if migrant is female)    18.103
* 1.870   14.904  1.190 
   
No. of obs  3,256    2,814 
Wald
2 χ  (16)  103.38   65.65 
  (Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000)    (Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000) 
Exogeneity test: Wald
2 χ  (1)  25.86   4.63 
  (Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000)    (Pr > 
2 χ = 0.032) 
Note:  1 Common-law  union  =  plase in Haitian Creole. 
  *, **, ***, imply significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
variables, except for age, maintained in the chosen model have the expected signs and 
are significant at either the 5 or 1 per cent levels.25 The level of schooling does not 
seem to have an important impact on the migration probability. An additional year of 
education is associated with a 1 per cent higher probability of migration while a one unit 
increase in the wealth level of a family increases this probability by almost 11 per cent. 
For this last variable the inflexion point would take place at a wealth level 
approximately equivalent to 14. Interestingly, with the exception of three observations 
found in the second richest quintile, all households beyond this threshold belong to the 
first distribution quintile. Both network variables have, as expected, a positive impact 
on the probability of migration and are significant. The strongest effect, however, is 
noted in the presence of a returned migrant in the household, which is consistent with 
the theoretical prediction in the literature. Households in the semi-urban and rural areas 
exhibit a higher emigration probability compared to those in the metropolitan area of 
Port-au-Prince. Livestock and landholding, which we entered as substitutes for perfect 
credit markets, show positive effect on migration probability. As can be observed from 
the table, the impact of livestock is almost seven-fold compared to land, which may be 
indicative of the fact that the former is a more marketable, liquid, and fungible asset 
than the latter. Consistent with the previous observation, households involved in 
                                                 
25   We expected that age and age squared follow a U-shaped pattern, whereby migration probability 
would increase with age but the very young and very old adults are less likely to migrate, except for 
(primarily) family reunification motives.   13 
agricultural activities and fisheries have a lower emigration probability. The same 
applies to nuclear families.  
The results for the instrumental variable Tobit model are given in Table 3, with the 
number of monthly hours worked censored below and above at 53 and 240 hours, 
respectively. Separate estimations are implemented for working-aged men and women. 
The coefficients for both genders on remittances show a negative sign and are 
significant at the 1 and 5 per cent levels, respectively. The negative sign, however, is 
not to be construed of as indicative of remittances greatly influencing the labour market 
outcomes in Haiti. In fact, the negative influence is, on average, negligible, which is 
rather understandable, given the high level of unemployment characterizing Haiti’s 
economy, where the formal unemployment rate is 60-70 per cent.  
From the table we can note that an increment of HTG 100 in the adult equivalent 
monthly remittances reduces the monthly hours worked by men, on average, by seven 
units. In other words, an almost 50 per cent increase in the monthly equivalent adult 
remittance income results, ceteris paribus, only in a 7 per cent decline for men in the 
average monthly hours worked. The same nominal increment is associated with a five 
hour decline for women. In relative terms, however, the same extension of women’s 
equivalent adult monthly remittance income would represent a 10 per cent loss of the 
labour hours worked. This is a feasible observation insofar as female-headed households 
receive almost twice as much in remittances as their male counterparts, and that women 
are expected to reallocate hours of wage employment to home production.26  
With respect to other variables considered in the estimation, some of these require 
further attention. It is remarkable that the experience of men does not account for their 
participation in the labour market and exhibits a sign opposite to what would be 
expected. In contrast, the experience of women tends to increase, up to a certain 
threshold, the number of hours worked. The years of schooling of individuals and 
household wealth also increase the number of hours worked, while married household 
heads unexpectedly supply less labour (albeit with an insignificant coefficient). 
Households with returned migrants understandably provide more labour hours since the 
returnee’s decision is assumed to be rational, in that his return home implies that the 
opportunity cost of staying abroad outweighs that of returning (except in the case of 
deported individuals). This coefficient, however, is not significant among women. More 
work hours are supplied by households whose property is owned de jure as well as by 
households of greater size, but effect is only significant for women. A (hardship) 
variable is included to control for households being located in Haiti’s harsher regions, 
namely those with the highest prevalence of poverty, of unemployment, and greatest 
levels of inequality. These conditions affect two regions: Départment du Nord-Est 
(northeast) and Départment du Nord-Ouest (northwest). Households in these two 
regions supply less total hours than households in other regions of the country.  
To compare the robustness of the main findings in the instrumental variable Tobit 
estimation above, an instrumental variable probit model is estimated where the 
dependent variable is 1 if the household is employed and 0 otherwise. The results are 
reported in Appendix Table A4. The same behavioural pattern is observed with respect 
to remittance income, whereby income transfers cause a decline in the probability of 
labour market participation for both genders. It is worth emphasizing that such a 
                                                 
26 In the Haitian context, reallocation could simply imply more leisure (considered to be a normal good). 14 
negative impact of remittances on the probability of labour market participation is 
virtually nil, given the very low magnitude of the decline. These average results, 
however, should be analysed with cautious.  
Haitian migrants relocate to different countries, each with very diverse economic 
circumstances, so that the potential impact from remittance transfers on labour market 
outcomes varies. For instance, a considerable number of Haitians settle in the 
Dominican Republic, which ranks second after the United States in terms of the stock of 
Haitian households; Canada ranks as third largest destination country. Information on 
certain characteristics of the migrants (e.g., education level, amount of money remitted) 
is not available from the survey. However, given the difference in average income 
between the major destination countries (US, Canada and the Dominican Republic), it 
seems plausible to assume that compared to Haitians settling in the US and Canada, 
those relocating to the DR are, in general, low-skilled workers with poor educational 
background. Therefore, their capacity to remit money home would be much lower and 
the presence of these low-skilled workers could bias the average results obtained thus 
far.27 
Thus, we control for the presence of migrants in Dominican Republic to estimate the 
same models as posited previously. We further refine the model using only the same 
functional forms to take into consideration migrant households from the US and 
Canada. The results are given in Appendix Table A5. Only the impact on the variable of 
interest is reported, as in general there has been no change in the signs of the control 
variables and all other statistics of the goodness-of-fit of the regression models perform 
much better under these two subsamples.  
As expected, under both the IV-Tobit and IV-probit estimations, the impact of 
remittance income on labour market outcomes is more acute, particularly for men. For 
this group, controlling for the DR, the decline in the number of hours worked is about 
50 per cent greater while the decrease is almost twofold in the US and Canada 
subsample. Women in turn exhibit a consistent pattern with practically no variation in 
the number of hours worked or labour force participation.  
Nonetheless, a closer look at the Haitian labour market may provide some useful 
insights. If we adopt a rather conservative stance, assuming that workers in migrant 
households earn double the minimum wage, and furthermore use the prevailing official 
2001 minimum wage as benchmark,28 the impact of (say) HGT 100 increase would 
represent a loss of almost HTG 61 per month in the case of men, while for women, the 
opportunity cost is about HTG 47 per month. Foregone incomes are more than 
compensated by the increment in remittance income. Nevertheless, using the US and 
Canada subsample only, the opportunity cost for men goes up to HTG 115 per month. 
This may be indicative of a greater response of the labour hours of men to remittances 
without implying, however, that a real decline in working time is affected by the 
                                                 
27 Approximately one of five Haiti migrants lives in the Dominican Republic and only one-third of these 
send remittances back home, as reported by the recipients. To imply a fair reflection of the difference 
in average incomes between North America and the Dominican Republic, we assume  that remittances 
from the DR represent, on average, approximately 10 per cent of the amounts originating from the US 
and Canada.  
28 Official minimum wage as of 2001, as established by the 4 May 1995 bill, was HTG 36 per day.  See 
Le Nouvelliste (2003). 15 
presence of remittance income. The disaggregation of working time into different types 
of employment would provide more useful information for assessing the impact of 
international remittances on labour market outcomes.  
6 Concluding  remarks 
Accounting for selectivity bias in household migration-decisions and endogeneity in the 
determination of remittances, this paper analyses the nexus between international 
migration, remittances and labour market outcomes in the Republic of Haiti. Different 
econometric methods are used to model the migration probability, the decision to remit, 
and labour market participation of remittance-recipient households. First, a count model 
using a zero-altered negative binomial with logit inflation is chosen to estimate 
migration probability, while a 2SLQ methodology is adopted to investigate the decision 
to remit and the effects on labour market.  
In light of what is established in the labour economics literature, namely that the supply 
of labour is a negative function of the reservation wage, remittances are expected, 
ceteris paribus, to exert a negative influence on the labour supply of the households 
with access to this non-market income flow, insofar as it increases the recipients’ 
reservation wage. According to the standard conjecture, this negative effect in a 
developing country context such as the Republic of Haiti will be strong among women, 
especially when dependency ratios are high. This assumption is based on the rational 
that the shadow value of women’s market wages decreases29 in the presence of 
remittances. Therefore, women’s wages may be more sensitive to remittance flows than 
those of men. Indeed, the results show a negative impact of remittances on labour 
market outcomes, using both the IV-Tobit for hours worked and the IV-probit for labour 
market participation. This negative impact notwithstanding, the evidence does not 
support the conjecture of greater sensitiveness of female labour in the presence of 
remittances. As we have demonstrated, the simulated drop in labour income in using the 
official minimum wage is more than offset by the increment in remittance income 
(except for men in the case of the US and Canada migrant households only). In fact, it 
may well be the case that a reallocation of labour time develops with respect to men’s 
labour. In this respect, a better picture of the dynamics between international migration, 
remittances, and labour market outcomes for determining the possible impact of 








                                                 
29  To put it differently, their reservation wage increases. 16 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A1 
Income quintiles, education, migration and international remittances  
Quintile 
(from poorest 
 to richest) 
















1 7  0.07    -1.02  0.16  11  0.53 
2 9  0.2    -0.79  0.25  20  0.44 
3 12  0.3    -0.59  0.27  24  0.38 
4 17  0.4    0.10  0.34  31  0.37 
5 32  0.4    3.04  0.52  48  0.39 
Source:   Author’s own calculations based on the ECVH-2001. 
 
Appendix Table A2 
 Migration and remittance recipient status, education, wealth and income  
Household  
status 













Migrant 22  1.9    1.30  66  28 
Non-migrant 11 0.3    -0.55  8  3 
Recipient 25  1.7    1.56  na  41 
Non-recipient 11  0.4    -0.53  na  na 










Appendix Table A3 
Zero-altered negative binomial-logit inflation model 
(working age 15-64 yrs) 
 Coeff  z-Stat  Marginal  effect  z-Stat 
Years of schooling  0.025
***  4.600   0.012
***  4.600 
Wealth index  0.222
*** 12.320   0.109
***  12.290 
Wealth index squared  -0.008
*** -6.730   -0.004
***  -6.770 
Age   -0.035
** -2.400   -0.017
**  -2.410 
Age squared  0.001
*** 3.140   2.7E+04
***  3.140 
Married (1 if married, or lives in common-law union)1 0.235
*** 4.170   0.122
***  3.960 
Presence of returned migrant  0.897
*** 9.900   0.684
***  6.730 
Interaction migration rate and household size  0.175
*** 5.800   0.086
***  5.790 
Livestock (number of large animals)  0.191
** 2.760   0.094
**  2.770 
Hectare (land holding in hectares)  0.028
** 2.290   0.014
**  2.280 
Semi-urban 0.361
*** 4.030   0.199
***  3.600 
Rural 0.382
*** 4.380   0.180
***  4.540 
Intercept -0.931
*** -3.170      
   
Logit inflation model           
Log likelihood: -5742.47           
   
Farming and fisheries  1.600***  4.430    -0.102***  -3.700 
Nuclear family  1.470***  4.190    -0.094***  -3.590 
Intercept -3.156***  -6.480       
Α  1.302*** 12.414      
   
    
No. of observations  6,070          
Nonzero observations  1,790
          
Zero observations  4,280          
Wald
2 χ (12)  665, (Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000)         
LR test, Ho: ln α = -∞ : 
2(01) χ = 438, (Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000)         
Vuong test:   z = 3.82, ( Pr > z = 0.000)          
AIC = 11,519           
BIC = 11,633           
Note:  1  Common-law union = plase in Haitian Creole. 












Appendix Table A4 
IV-Probit model of labour market participation by headship 
(working age 15-64 yrs) 
 Men  z-Stat  Women  z-Stat 
Monthly equivalent remittances  -1.1E-03
*** -5.720 -4.1E-04
**  -2.550 
Years of schooling  0.026
** 2.870 0.028
***  3.370 
Wealth index  0.152
*** 5.350 0.080
**  2.090 
Experience 0.006  0.400  0.070
***  7.700 
Experience squared  -1.1E-04 -0.510  -9.8E-04  -7.250 
Married (1 if married or lives in common-law union)1  -0.170
** -2.290 -0.117
*   
Returned migrant  0.549
*** 3.290 0.251
**   
Home (1 if property is owned de jure) 0.079  1.010  0.138
**   
Household size  0.048
*** 3.470 0.046
***   
Hardship   -0.731
*** -7.740 -0.349
***   
Livestock (number of large animals)  -0.292
*** -3.620 -0.206
**   
Hectare (land holding in hectares)  0.127
*** 5.680 0.096
***   
Semi-urban 0.527
*** 4.100 0.105  
Rural 0.444
*** 3.670 0.052  
Male (1 if migrant is male)  0.322
*** 2.910 0.096  
Female (1 if migrant is female)  0.164  1.330  0.184
*   
   
   
No. of observations  3,256  2,814 
Wald
2 χ (16)     180.31 
(Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000) 
157.36 
(Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000) 
Exogeneity test: Wald
2 χ (1)  35.93 
(Pr > 
2 χ = 0.000) 
3.79 
(Pr > 
2 χ = 0.052) 
Note:  1  Common-law union = plase in Haitian Creole. 





Appendix Table A5 
Marginal effect after controlling for the Dominican Republic 
(working age 15-64 yrs) 
 Men  z-Stat  Women  z-Stat 
All migrant houses, excl. those in Dominican Republic 
   
   
IV-Tobit (hours worked)  -0.097
*** -3.030   -0.054
**  -2.460 
IV-Probit (employment probability)  -2.0E-03
*** -3.800   -6.4E-04
***  -3.050 
No. of observations  3,084  2,595 
   
   
US and Canadian migrant households only     
IV-Tobit (hours worked)  -0.128** -2.580  -0.052***  -3.110 
IV-Probit (employment probability)  -3.4E-03*** -3.040 -5.8E-04***  -3.050 
No. of observations  2,992  2,507 
Note:  *** = significance at 1% level. All other statistics perform much better under these subsamples. 
 
 
 